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Abstract
Through innovation and creativity, the Russian government is on track to potentially become the
most dominant world superpower. They are not doing this through superior military technology
or revolutionary diplomacy. Russia has been conducting Information Warfare against the United
States and its allies, and Information Warfare is changing how war is conceptualized. The United
States, Russia, and other nation-states find themselves gridlocked in a non-kinetic war with
real-world ramifications. As Russia has evolved from the fall of the Soviet Union, the fact
remains that Russia still wishes to become the most dominant world superpower by invoking a
war of attrition utilizing Information Warfare.
Keywords: CISA, critical infrastructure, cyber network operations, cyber warfare,
disinformation, information-psychological, information-technological, Information Warfare,
Russia, Superpower.
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Russia: Domination Through Information
Russia has nearly perfected the art of the next generation of warfare. It has accomplished
this without soldiers, weapons, or tactical kinetic means. The Russian government, under
President Vladimir Putin, has used a new type of warfare that no longer requires soldiers on the
battlefield. This new Information Warfare has changed how all future battles and wars will be
fought. The present and future Russian agenda will be molded by how the United States and the
Western European nations conduct themselves in response to this new type of warfare. The
Russian regime has changed since the fall of the Soviet Union, and the strategies used by the
regime have evolved.  However, the goal remains the same - to achieve and maintain its position
as the most dominant world superpower. This paper will illustrate how Russia intends to
accomplish world dominance by utilizing Information Warfare to create discord and maintain
suppression of the West's critical infrastructure and democratic processes.
The Fog and Friction of Information
Information Warfare is an older concept of warfare that has been used throughout history.
Information Warfare has its origins in the 5th century, B.C. through the teachings of the Chinese
philosopher, general, and military strategist Sun Tzu. Tzu stated that “The skillful leader subdues
the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he
overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field” (Tzu, 2017, p. 11). What is
important to understand about Information Warfare is that it is truly about how the means are
utilized to attain the ends. The means are the ability and the act of manipulating the trusted
information of one’s adversary without the adversary’s knowledge (Glenn, 1989). The
underlying goal is to gain informational superiority over one’s enemy. One of the earliest
instances where this strategy of disinformation was used was during the 5th century
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Roman-Persian wars to discredit Heraclius. During the conflict, double agents were dispatched in
order to gain strategic advantage in the campaigns (Howard-Johnston, 1999). As technology
advanced, mankind created a more interconnected society, which allowed for individuals to
communicate over far distances. This however did not change at the base level what information
was and how valuable it can be. Communication technology allowed militaries to communicate
rapidly and become more interconnected (Satia, 2010). While in some aspects this made the
information more available it also created a secrecy around information (Satia, 2010). As
technology has advanced, society has become more reliant upon it, which can make the average
individual subject susceptible to becoming a victim of Information Warfare. Such susceptibility
can allow for individuals to be both impressionable and potential weapons against a specific
person, nation, or ideology.
As technology and society have advanced, so have military forces. An adversary's
government or military can use a number of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to conduct
warfare against an enemy. These TTPs can include non-kinetic Cyber Network Operations,
Psychological Operations, Information Operations, and disinformation (Giles, 2016). Creating
miscommunication and disinformation allows confusion, with the ultimate goal being that while
confused and divided, the enemy is weak and ineffective at warfare.
Russia has implemented the teachings of Sun Tzu to subdue certain enemies in varying
ways without any kinetic means. In 2015, the Russians were likely suspects of taking out parts of
the Ukrainian power grid through non-kinetic cyber network operations (Lee et al., 2016). In
essence, the Russians were able to attack and cripple parts of Ukraine for a short time without
ever having to enter into outright warfare. This cyber ability alone can create confusion,
contribute to miscommunication, and cripple a country for an extended period of time. With this
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knowledge, Russia was able to invest heavily into further developing and strengthening cyber
operations. In 2019, a report by Check Point Software Technologies claimed that state-sponsored
[Russian] actors invested a “significant amount of money and effort” to develop large-scale
espionage capabilities, more specifically, in offensive cyber capabilities (Lilly & Cheravitch,
2020, p. 146).
Information Warfare echoes the sentiments of some of the great philosophers and military
minds throughout the ages. In Clausewitz’s On War, Clausewitz describes the “fog and friction”
of warfare as the military impediments and confusion that one can encounter on the battlefield
(Clausewitz et al., 1989, p. 216). Today’s warfare is information, and the enemy, whether they be
a nation-state or a non-state actor, utilizes cyber in a way which allows for anonymity. Cyber
attacks and disinformation campaigns are occurring so often and in such great numbers that it
can be overwhelming to any individual person or nation-state. The anonymity and the sheer
number of attacks that occur can be thought of as modern-day elements of fog and friction.
Clausewitz refers to the term “fog” to represent the unreliability of information in
warfare, concluding that “war is the realm of uncertainty” (Clausewitz et al., 1989, p. 216). In the
twenty-first century, cyber disinformation is just that - uncertain. The information received that
was once thought of as credible is now difficult to discern as to its veracity and credibility. The
uncertainty of how Information Warfare attacks will occur, where they will occur, or how they
will affect their targets creates a fog-based warfare.
Friction ties into fog but is a truly different concept. Clausewitz states, “We have
identified danger, physical exertion, intelligence and friction as the elements that coalesce to
form the atmosphere of war, and turn it to a medium that impedes activity. In their restrictive
efforts, they can be grouped into a single concept of friction” (Clausewitz et al., 1989, p. 224).
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How military intelligence and computer network data is processed has undoubtedly bridged the
gap of uncertainty, yet many individuals in the intelligence community and policy makers rely on
the incessant desire for absolute certainty in the modern battlefield. This is simply not feasible,
according to Clausewitz, as there will always be uncertainty. Friction is the force that makes the
apparently easy so difficult. Friction is the interaction of chance and action and can be caused by
many factors, to include the enemy forces, friendly actions, or the environment (Lere, 2017).
Information Warfare takes uncertainties and places opposing information upon the public
and/or military, resulting in a modern-day fog and friction. According to Lere (2017), fog and
friction cannot be erased from warfare, regardless of advances in thinking and technology.
Technology advancement changes the nature of uncertainty, but it does not eliminate it. The
thought is that technology advances will create a more capable way to eliminate the fog of war,
in order to prevent unexpected disruptions. Warfare, specifically Information Warfare, is far too
unpredictable, no matter how well-connected or rapid the information process is.
Information Warfare also echoes ideas of the French military strategist, Antoine-Henri
Jomini. Jomini and Clausewitz are similar in some of their thoughts about strategy, but they also
have some differing viewpoints. Clausewitz utilized strategy when conceptualizing warfare in its
entirety, both on and off the battlefield and in how countries utilize warfare as a means of
diplomacy. Jomini, on the other hand, conceptualized strategy and operations as a much more
rule-based system. This allowed Jomini’s approach to warfare to be much more systematic than
that of Clausewitz, breaking down each part of the military into manageable components.
Specifically, Jomini believed that, “strategy decides where to act” (Hench, 2019, p. 2). When
thinking about how Russia has used Information Warfare over the past twenty or more years, one
can compare Russian Information Warfare to that of Jomini’s maxims. In the Fundamental
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Principle of War Jomini outlines the four maxims which align closely with Information Warfare.
Those maxims include, “To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of
one’s forces...To throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point ” (Calhoun, 2011, p. 27).
Throughout the twenty-first century, Russia has used these two maxims in several instances, such
as the massive attack on Estonia in 2007 (Otis, 2018), or the Internet Research Agency’s use of
fake accounts to overly focus a specific opinion on another country's elected officials (US vs.
IRA, 2018).
Over the course of five or more years, Russia used hackers, often called trolls. These
trolls created fake social media accounts and spread specific news stories in order to gain control
of the social media narrative. Attacking news sources and social media were decisive points.
Russia used a large force illustrating Jomini’s teachings, to achieve this. With this large force
Russia economized its forces through the Internet Research Agency (IRA). Through this large
force Russia instructed its trolls to go after decisive points. The point in question was public
opinion on social media (US vs. IRA, 2018). Russia capitalized on the United States being
founded upon the understanding that a democratic country is built on disagreements, debate, and
compromise, which then allowed Russia to find the proper targets. Russia utilized the platforms
of online news articles and social media to target specific groups of individuals in order to
change the narrative. Jomini’s maxim of economizing a large force toward a specific fraction is
illustrated by Russia’s use of a large force, such as the IRA, on specific social media groups to
create disagreements in a country, and those groups then created protests to act against their
country. Due to the nature of social media and the quantity and quality of the fake accounts it is
nearly impossible to say if this had a direct impact on citizens of the United States. Therefore the
belief that Russia created divides in the United States is that of correlating factors. Russia did,
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however, focus its force on the decisive point of the United States’ polarization in society. By
focusing on the political, and social divides the Russian’s through the IRA cranked the discontent
and polarization up. This created a hyper focused society, through social media, on what
separates citizens as opposed to what they agree upon. This coincides with social media groups
and certain other groups, such as far-leaning left or right individuals who subscribe to these
groups. Creating disinformation on a large scale, in these social media groups, with a massive
force such as the IRA, uses Jomini’s maxims against countries such as the United States and the
Ukrainian free elections (Chen, 2015).
The Many Vectors of Information Warfare
Understanding how Russia has used these philosophies of warfare is predicated upon
understanding how Russia views Information Warfare in general. In the West, specifically the
United States, there is a term known as cyber warfare. Cyber warfare is the use of digital attacks
to assail a nation or organization, which can cause comparable harm to actual warfare and/or
disrupt vital computer systems (Singer & Friedman, 2014). As technology has advanced, the
United States has become increasingly reliant upon its cyber technology, as the United States’
critical infrastructure is controlled through a multitude of cyber systems. However, Russia’s
implementation of Information Warfare is a drastically different thought process. The Russians
tend to conceptualize Information Warfare with a broad, comprehensive framework which spans
multiple areas, including computer network operations, electronic warfare, psychological
operations, and information operations (Connor & Vogler, 2017). Any one of these examples, or
in some cases all four of these, have been used in unison to obtain a critical effect against the
West. These critical effects were deemed necessary by the Kremlin and aided its strategic goal.
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In its infancy, Information Warfare in the Soviet Union was carried out through
disinformation campaigns aimed against the West. These campaigns of disinformation would
later be known as Active Measures (Bertlesen, 2021). These programs included disinformation,
propaganda, deception, sabotage, destabilization, and espionage. Active Measures and
Information Warfare are nearly synonymous, with the only slight difference being that
Information Warfare uses electronic warfare and cyber network operations in tandem with
disinformation (Bertlesen, 2021). This paper will discuss case studies of each one of these
operations to show how Russia has used everything in its Information Warfare arsenal. As Russia
has likely perpetrated attacks against multiple democratic countries, it has grown in capability,
skills, and intelligence. It is critical that other nations understand how Russian intelligence uses
Information Warfare, how Russia can protect the country through its use, and just how
ill-equipped the rest of the world is in dealing with Information Warfare.
Russia has used one of its four Information Warfare avenues of attack to push the
Kremlin’s agenda on nation-states. When the Soviet Union was in power under Stalin,
disinformation campaigns were tactics used to change the narrative inside of the country. Stalin
used this tactic to get rid of any political opposition. Stalin would fabricate stories to sway public
opinion. This was a tactic later used by the KGB and is still used today by Russia (Bertlesen,
2021). What the West calls disinformation, Russia calls dezinformatsiya. Disinformation is false
information that is spread with malicious intent, meaning the information is meant to deliberately
deceive an intended audience (Pacepa, 2013). This term is often confused with the terms
misinformation and propaganda. Misinformation is information spread without malicious intent.
Propaganda is persuasive information, usually political in nature, spread in order to promote or
publicize a specific political cause or point of view (Pacepa, 2013). Disinformation, when it was
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originally instituted during Stalin’s reign in the 1940s, was published in leaflets and its own
newspapers for people to read. The practice of disinformation eventually escalated over the years
to other countries’ newspapers. The Soviet Union would typically plant disinformation as a real
news story in a third-world country's news outlet. Since the third-world countries did not have
proper training or money to do proper independent research and fact-check all of their sources,
multiple disinformation campaigns were looked upon as actual news in those parts of the world.
As a falsified story would pick up traction, it would make its way to the masses (Ellick &
Westbrook, 2018). This was not a perfect science, but it did work to create rumors and
conspiracy theories, with a prime example being the story that HIV was created in a lab within
the United States at Fort Dix in the 1980s. This news story began as a conceptualized piece of
disinformation that Russia planned to use in Operation InfeKtion, and it is a prime example of
how Russia fabricated information to its own advantage (Ellick & Westbrook, 2018). Russia
began by planting the story in multiple newspapers in third-world countries, namely India,
Pakistan, and African countries. A few years later, this story made it to the nightly news in the
United States. Despite the fact that the story was a conspiracy theory, the story’s spread
illustrates how disinformation can grow and be taken seriously by intended or targeted victims.
Disinformation is not the only tool that Russia uses in this Information Warfare. Russia
has also been known to use Cyber Network Operations (CNO), often in tandem with
disinformation. In 2007, Russia conducted the world’s first large-scale cyber attack on a
nation-state. To set the historical stage for the cyber attack, it is important to note that the small
country of Estonia, a former Soviet-block nation until breaking away in 1991, was
technologically advanced in comparison to many other countries in the region at the time. Due to
the small size of the country both physically and in terms of population, Estonia modernized its
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technology in order to grow its GDP (Gross Domestic Product), which in turn aided the country’s
economy (Ottis, 2018). Estonia placed much of its infrastructure online via the public websites
and public internet, which spanned roughly 80 percent of the country. During that time, Estonia
was the victim of a Distributed Denial of Services attack or a DDoS. A DDoS occurs when a
computer hacker, or group of hackers, uses a botnet, embedded with a virus or malware, to
continually call up a webpage or website. The hacker can then use all of the computer systems
that were tied into the botnet and simultaneously conduct an action on behalf of itself. In the case
of Estonia, it is likely that a group of hackers had created a massive botnet and used it to
continually flood the Estonian government’s website with a request to view the website. The
botnet was said to have been comprised of as many as one or two million pre-infected bots, in
approximately 175 different jurisdictions (NATO, 2019). Approximately 1.5 million computers
in different countries all worked together in order to attack the Estonian infrastructure. In turn,
this overload caused websites and servers to crash. Because the government websites were tied
to banking, public works, and voting information, personally identifiable information of Estonian
citizens was compromised. For three weeks, the hackers effectively shut down an entire country's
economy and governing body without the source ever being known. Though multiple details
contributed to the perfect storm of the hack, the catalyst appeared to be that the Estonian
government wished to move a bronze statue that was symbolic to the Russians (NATO, 2019).
According to a NATO study of the events (2019), the timeline of the attacks is as follows:
On 27 April 2007, the first wave of uncoordinated attacks on high-profile websites began. The
attacks targeted the President, Parliament, police, political parties, and major media outlets. The
next day, there was a coordinated counter-attack against the DDoS by the Estonian Ministry of
Defense, in cooperation with CERT-EE, Estonia’s national information security organization.
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One week later, on 4 May 2007, a second, more advanced cyber attack occurred and targeted
banks, specifically Hansabank and SEB Eesti Uhisbank. Two weeks after that, the cyber attacks
abruptly and simultaneously ceased on 19 May 2007. Because this attack episode occurred
rapidly, seemingly out of nowhere, and then abruptly stopped, it became clear that whoever was
responsible for the attack could stop and start a potential act of war with the click of a button.
Significant damage was done to Estonia during those days, with lost productivity, opportunity
cost, remediation, and the acquisition of alternative web hosting at emergency rates estimated to
be in the billions of euros (NATO, 2019). Due to the unconventional nature of the attack, the
citizens could have significantly lost trust in the Estonian government. The quick response of the
government, together with support from NATO and multiple nations, ensured that Estonia
properly recovered without widespread mistrust (NATO, 2019).
Which entity was the true culprit behind the attacks that nearly crippled Estonia? Due to
the nature, complexity, and size of the attack, it could have been assumed to be the proper
Russian government. However, at the time, it was inconclusive who was to blame for the attack.
The ambiguity of this attack created confusion among the international community; however,
according to NATO (2019), it is believed that Russia was at fault. Although there is proof that
cyber attacks have been launched in numerous countries, it is difficult to prove conclusively that
the Russian government is at fault or is directly behind these attacks (Ottis, 2018). It seems to
have become a trend in recent years that Russia has become the main suspect in an Information
Warfare operation, but the Russian government has rarely, if ever, been caught with a smoking
gun (NATO, 2019). There is normally plausible deniability to distance the Kremlin from any
action that may or may not have occurred as a direct order from the Russian government.
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Russia, like multiple countries, has been known to outsource its operations to non-state
actors or actors. China, Iran, and even North Korea have all been known to outsource cyber
attacks and pay actors in different currency types to attack nation-state systems and private
companies separately (Connor & Vogler, 2017). What makes Russia unique, when compared
with Iran or North Korea, is money and education. Russia still benefits from money and
institutions built from the old Soviet era. This has allowed Russia to draw on a vast number of
highly-skilled and often underemployed communities of technical experts. Due to the fact that
these technical experts are looking for work, compounded by the majority of the wealth in the
country being held by powerful individuals in the government, it has likely resulted in a
hacker-for-hire industry  (Connor & Vogler, 2017). Eastern European and Russian hackers are
widely considered to be some of the best in the world (Connor & Vogler, 2017). This expertise is
an outgrowth of the staggering number of individuals who take computer science advanced
placement (AP) exams in Russia, especially compared with the United States. A 2014 study on
computer science in Russia found that roughly 60,000 Russian students register each year to take
the equivalent of an AP computer science examination (Krebs, 2017). Over a ten year span, the
data suggest that approximately 600,000 Russian citizens have taken the Russian AP computer
science exam, whereas The College Board in the United States reported that between 2005 and
2016, a total of 270,000 high school students opted to take the national AP exam in computer
science (Krebs, 2017).
Individuals from the computer science arena have been hired by other nation-states to
conduct cyber attacks on different infrastructures, as well as against private Western
corporations. Due to the fact that the Russian government ranks as one of the most corrupt
countries in the world, ranking at 129 out of 180 (Transparency International, 2021), with most
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of the power centered around President Putin and his affluent allies, it is highly likely that the
Russian government has paid for a proxy army to do their anonymous bidding. Using a proxy
force to conduct CNO allows Russia plausible deniability, with an arsenal of cyber warriors who
are guns-for-hire (Connor & Vogler, 2017). This strategy of hiring hacktivists as the technical
experts ends up being much more cost-effective, and it allows for an ideal operation. These
hacktivists are conducting grey zone Information Warfare operations, which provides another
layer of anonymity.
Russian information operations are not just based on civilian or government officials
using technology to disrupt other nation-states. Information operations can be used as an actual
convention of warfare. During the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, Russian Electronic Warfare (EW)
capabilities were limited at best. Although Russian ground forces were successful against the
Georgian army, the Russian Air Force had a difficult time suppressing Georgian air defenses
through jamming efforts. This resulted in the loss of numerous Russian aircraft (Creery, 2019).
Russia has since prioritized investing in EW tools, with President Putin ordering at least seventy
percent of all Russian EW equipment to be modernized by 2020. Deputy Defense Minister Yuri
Borisov stated that the figure is now closer to approximately eighty or ninety percent (Creery,
2019). For Russia today, EW is used to simultaneously assist the country’s forces for early
warning surveillance. It is also used in jamming operations to create greater difficulty for
Russian military adversaries to create a clear Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(ISR) picture. Jamming operations create a confusing target picture for the adversary, which
drastically slows down their kill chain. EW advancements have allowed Russia to engage in
“non-contact operations”(Creery, 2019, p. 2) that can jam, blind, disrupt, and potentially
demoralize an adversary. Russia has used both military EW efforts in Crimea and Syria in order
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to perfect their stand-off capability. This EW affects communication, and due to potential
satellite degradation, it can hinder geolocation and targeting operations (Creery, 2019).
The staple of Information Warfare is disrupting communication on any or all levels.
Disrupting command and control abilities through non-kinetic means will allow Russia to retain
near peer effectiveness against the United States and its allied forces. Though Russia’s EW
capabilities have been continually advanced, EW allows for Russia to achieve strategic and
military goals against NATO. Specifically, the goals encompass the capability of Russia’s
anti-access/area-denial approach (A2/AD), which is clearly tailored against NATO’s Command,
Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR).
Modernizing its EW inventory and capabilities allows for the Russian military to seek out, and
likely gain, advantages to the asymmetric warfare that much of the world has begun to adopt.
It has been established that Russia has the tools and tactics of CNO, psychological
operations, and EW together, creating strategic information operations. Russian military
strategists and tacticians have studied information operations and observed how it can be used to
foster disorganized governance, organize anti-government protests, influence public opinion, and
potentially reduce an opponent’s will to resist (Jonsson, 2019). Cyber Information Operations
allow Russia to covertly achieve these objectives. Col. S.G. Chekinov and Lt. Gen. S.A.
Bogdanov (Ret.) studied both information operations and asymmetric warfare. Chekinov and
Bogdanov both expressed their belief that it is critical for cyber information operations to
precede any type of offensive attack, as this strategy and tactic will weaken their adversary. Their
belief is that using cyber information operations is imperative before the onset of a traditional
military operation (Thomas, 2017). In some ways, this reflects Jomini’s fundamental principle of
war in his maxims, “To maneuver the mass of the army, successively upon the decisive points of
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a theater of war, and attack the enemy’s lines of communication as frequently as possible while
still protecting its own” (Calhoun, 2011, p. 27-28). Cyber information operations can be used as
both an offensive action and a defensive measure to protect important information (Singer &
Friedman, 2014). Rather than envisioning a physical army, one can think of a bot-net ready to
attack. Maneuvering this massive bot-net army on decisive points of a nation-state’s critical
infrastructure can be accomplished most specifically through software and internet connections.
Using a cyber means of attack inherently degrades communication efforts for a nation-state or
private corporation. Cyber attacks allow for communications to be continually bombarded with
attacks on an extremely consistent basis. It also may allow for espionage to take place.
As Information Warfare is such a broad term, several questions arise as to logistical
implementation. When it comes to how Russian doctrine wages Information Warfare, Russia
does not employ only a technology-based approach. To expand upon this, Russia uses known
cyber vulnerabilities against their adversaries, in addition to information at any and all levels, to
include, social media, critical infrastructure, or personal computing technology (Connor &
Vogler, 2017). Russia uses the manipulation of information through cyber exploitation to gather
intelligence on an adversary's systems (Connor & Vogler, 2017). The systems can be exploited at
multiple levels, whether it be one’s personal computer, a government network, or the critical
infrastructure being run on a stand-alone network. With this understanding, Russia then has the
ability to manipulate, exploit, and attack. The United States relies heavily on its infrastructure,
specifically on its computer network. The more the United States relies on its cyber abilities to
house and send information, the more vulnerable the United States will likely become, based on
Russian Information Warfare strategy.
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Understanding how Russia can manipulate information and data is important when
deciphering Russia’s goals in becoming the most dominant superpower in the world. Russia
understands that there are different avenues of approach in Information Warfare. Russia has also
noted that there are two different spheres of influence that can be manipulated in Information
Warfare - information-technical and information-psychological. Information-technical is
concerned with machine-driven data components, information infrastructure, and the means of
transmission. Information-psychological encompasses anything to do with influencing the minds
of the population, government figures, elites, and the military (Jonsson, 2019). Disinformation
campaigns are information-psychological in nature; however, they can be spread with malicious
intent on social media, which is an information-technology medium. It becomes difficult to draw
the line between the two, as they blur together seamlessly. Disinformation campaigns, as a
whole, are considered information-psychological, as the intent is to sway perception of an issue.
The Estonia attacks are an example of information-technology, where technology can be used to
attack a cyber-based infrastructure, whether they be private or government affiliated.
A New Russian Philosophy
Over the past decade, Westerners have believed that Russia operates under hybrid
warfare. This way of thinking was likely brought about by General Staff Chief Gerasimov’s 2013
speech in Russia (Thomas, 2017). In his speech, Gerasimov discussed forms, which are military
organizations, and methods, which include weapons and types of military art. The forms and
methods that he discussed concerned the observations in war’s changing character. Gerasimov
explained how wars are no longer declared; rather, countries find themselves in a constant state
of conflict. That new-type of warfare, or next-generation warfare, is commonplace around the
world. Concerning these concepts in particular, nonmilitary methods are, at times, more effective
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than military ones. Information Warfare is the next generation of warfare, according to Russia,
evidenced by Russia’s belief that it is in a constant state of warfare against the West, specifically
the United States. The process that Gerasimov described in 2013, allowed for Russia to put in
place the steps which led to the successful annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in
2014. “Gerasimov first asserts that a combination of nonmilitary methods, including the protest
potential of the population, covert military measures, information operations, and special forces’
activities are being implemented by some nations in conflict” (Thomas, 2017, p. 36). It is
important to understand that Gerasimov observed some of these actions, including protest
potential and covert measures. These actions occurred previously in other nation-states. Then
Russia used this overarching strategy to annex Crimea. Gerasimov and the Russian leadership
took note of the revolutions happening throughout eastern europe and later in the Middle East
during the Arab Spring, as prime examples of how a new benchmark for warfare has been
achieved. Gerasimov’s speech further broke down how the next generation of warfare will be
fought, with his assertion being the principal tactic will be non-contact or remote engagement.
As information technology has reduced the spatial and temporal distances between opponents,
operational pauses are disappearing. This further shows that Russia believes that there will be a
constant state of Information Warfare ever-present in the next generation of warfare.
Tactics Meet Revolution
Through the color revolutions, two things occurred - Russia knew that a new era of
warfare was upon the world, and Russia believed that the West was already conducting it. The
threat of revolutions has been ever present and in the minds of Russian leadership since the
early-2000s. Color revolutions have their origins early-2000s, with nonviolent uprisings in
sections of former Soviet Union states. Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine succeeded in
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nonviolent protests from 2003 to 2005, with opposition to the Kremlin being the primary
objective of the protests. The protesting organizations were often financially supported by
Western organizations and/or governments (RFE/RL, 2014). The protests were rooted in a desire
for better relations with the West, and the countries undergoing the revolutions were aligned with
Western values. The 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine increased tensions as the Russian
government's criticisms of the movement grew stronger.
In the 2004 end-of-year press conference held by President Putin, Putin criticized the
United States and the European Union for their double-standard politics (Jonsson, 2019, Ch. 4, p.
125). He accused the United States and the West of being selective and instrumental in
propagating democracy and human rights in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, while not
supporting democracy and human rights movements for the Serbs in Kosovo, the Albanians in
Macedonia, or the ethnic Russians in Latvia. President Putin criticized the West for propping up
revolutions in some countries and not others. The United States and the West utilized a strategy
of going after countries that would hurt Russia, rather than pursuing an overarching goal of
assisting each individual country with achieving Western democracy. President Putin stated in
2004, “the most dangerous [thing]...is the creation of a system of permanent revolutions.”
(Jonsson, 2019, Ch. 4, p. 125) Three weeks later, in early-2005, Russian defense minister Sergei
Ivanov also criticized the West, specifically for its double standards on its Ukrainian policy. In
Russia’s view, the West would have only acknowledged the election and its results if the
candidate the West had backed actually won. Putin and Ivanov both heavily criticized the West,
as they believed that the West did not see the tertiary effects of supporting democracy by way of
revolution (Jonsson, 2019). In 2005, President Putin presented his concerns following the Orange
Revolution by saying, “the most important concern for me personally is not that there are some
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turbulent events there but that they go beyond the current legislation and constitution” (Jonsson,
2019, Ch. 4, p. 125).  Putin and Ivanov feared that as these revolutions, which were outside of
normal government legislation, continued, even more revolutions were inevitably to follow, thus
dooming these countries to a constant state of revolution. Putin and Ivanov believed these
revolutions to be exported by the West or Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Former deputy chief of the Russian presidential administration, Vladislav Surkov, called
attention to the likelihood that Russia felt threatened by the West during the multiple color
revolutions. Surkov noted in an interview that Russia must look to the West for the
“technological and intellectual solutions” to modernize the diplomatic, military, and economic
atmospheres of Russia (Jonsson, 2019, Ch 4, p. 126). These words did not fall on deaf ears, as
Russia was continuing to modernize the country during that time. The military and economy of
the country increased steadily over the next decade.
The apex of the color revolutions came in 2013-2014, with the Euromaidan revolt in
Ukraine. The protests of the Euromaidan revolution were sparked by the Ukrainian government’s
decision to suspend the signing of an association agreement with the European Union. Rather,
the Ukrainian government chose to keep closer ties to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union.
The protests were fueled by what was perceived as “widespread government corruption, abuse of
power, and violation of human rights in Ukraine” (RFE/RL, 2014, p. 1). The protests eventually
led to the Ukrainian government calling for the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovych and
his regime. Petro Poroshenko, who was one of the main supporters of the protests, was then
placed in power. These protests ultimately led to the defeat of authoritarian incumbents and made
way for democratic reforms. As the Putin Regime so closely resembled the authoritarian regimes
from years prior, such as “Slovakia (1998), Croatia and Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine
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(2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005)” (Bunce, 2017, p. 20), it forced the Putin regime to look
internally, as they feared they were destined for the same fate as the other former Soviet states..
The revolutions that took place outside of Russia had the ability to challenge Putin’s rule in
Russia. By 2004 to 2005, Putin’s approval rating took one of its most significant drops during
this time period. From 86% approval in December 2003 to 65% in February of 2005 (Elagina,
2021). These countries are near Russia in geographical proximity, and although they are not
controlled by the Kremlin, these revolutions could have inspired Russian’s to call for reforms
against the Kremlin.. This has likely kept the Kremlin safe from a color revolution in its own
country. However, due to the location of the revolutions and the striking similarities of the
outgoing regimes to that of the current Kremlin, it is logical to conclude that the Kremlin will
continue to diplomatically and fundamentally take a stance against color revolutions. As the
Kremlin does so, this diplomatic stance may allow for creative ways to combat Western NGOs
through Information Warfare (Bunce, 2017).
As the color revolutions progressed, Russia and the Putin regime saw this progression as
an encroaching threat. How could one halt a revolution without strictly countering a revolution
by diplomacy through military means? Rather than stop a revolution, why not persuade some of
those individuals to revolt in line with Russian ideology? Aligning a revolt that was in line with
Russian goals is how Russia constructed the use of their Information Warfare efforts. Russia
commenced using disinformation in mainstream media and state controlled news, along with
social media, to persuade large sectors of the population (Campbell, 2014). To illustrate, consider
Ukraine before the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The eastern half of Ukraine, along with the
Crimean peninsula, ethnically and linguistically aligned with Russia. This opened the door for
Russia to create a narrative in Eastern and Western Ukraine. While freedom of speech is allowed
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in Ukraine, the country is partially divided in its identity. Most residents of the Eastern part of
Ukraine speak and identify as Russian. Therefore, most of the news sources received in Eastern
Ukraine and abroad were in Russian news reports (Campbell, 2014). Such news reports cast a
wide net across nightly television news, printed news, and social media. With a large portion of
Ukraine believing that they are ethnically Russian, to include speaking the language, most of the
news that they received and listened to was from Russia (Campbell, 2014).
The Kremlin has a tight hold on news media in the country. As Campbell mentions,
“Russia has crafted a state media force which routinely circulates misinformation at home and
abroad” (2014, p. 1).  RT news is a Russian, state-controlled, international television network
funded by the federal tax budget of the Russian government (Fisher, 2019). Not only is a main
source of Russian news scripted by the government itself, Russia has what looks to be a credible
news source releasing news to the world, when the Kremlin actually largely controls the
narrative (Campbell, 2014). Governmental control of the news can allow disinformation
campaigns to take hold and sway narratives, which in turn can fuel the other sides’ protests and
demonstrations. If one protest is anti-Kremlin, the Russian government can simply air news
stories that are pro-Kremlin and against the protests. Russia’s use of this Information Warfare
strategy has successfully limited free speech in the country and has created distrust in news
sources.
Domestic Russian news sources that are specifically run by the state have affected the
populus of Russia. Due to the fact that the Russian citizens are deprived of comparable
alternative news sources, seventy percent of the Russian population turns to state-run television
for news, and they believe it to be a credible source (Campbell, 2014, p. 5). Without competing
narratives to provide a contrast to the state media, it becomes increasingly difficult to decipher
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truth and disinformation for the average citizen. Given that almost two-thirds of the Russian
population believe that Russian television provides an objective source of news, Putin’s regime
can effectively use state media to rally popular support for Putin’s agenda (Campbell, 2014). The
Putin regime is not just affecting public opinion and journalistic integrity and credibility in
Russia. The issue has spread like wildfire throughout the world’s media outlets. RT news is not
only international, with physical reporting in over 100 countries, but it also currently has over
four million subscribers on YouTube (Campbell, 2014). The Kremlin, through social media, has
the ability to spread disinformation globally and at rapid speed. With the success of Russian
state-sponsored media, it was only a matter of time before the Kremlin combined CNO and
disinformation together to attack their next challenge, social media.
The Weaponization of Disinformation
As established, Russia has used disinformation as part of its overall Information Warfare
strategy, in order to sow dissent in other nation-states. The culmination of Russian Information
Warfare is exhibited through the IRA. The United States Intelligence Community assessed and
described the agency as a troll farm. “The term ‘troll’ refers to internet users - in this context,
paid operatives - who post inflammatory or otherwise disruptive content on social media or other
websites” (Mueller, 2019, p. 18). A troll farm or troll factory is an institutionalised group of
individuals who, over the internet, seek to interfere in political opinions and decision-making
(Walker, 2017). A troll farm can be as effective in influencing a campaign for public office as it
can an election or debate. According to a study of sixty-five world governments in 2017, thirty
governments pay troll farms, like that of the IRA, to spread propaganda and disinformation.
According to the report, these governments use paid commentators, trolls, and bots to harass
journalists and erode trust in the media as a means to influence elections and misinform the
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public (Titcomb, 2017). Disinformation campaigns have officially been weaponized. According
to the US v. Internet Research Agency LLC (2018), the public now knows that several
disinformation campaigns operated during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. These operations
were successful at attracting widespread attention and inserting Russian messages into the public
discourse. The most prominent program that affected the 2016 election was out of Russia’s IRA.
While housed in Russia, the IRA conducted many operations to include creating thousands of
social media accounts impersonating Americans from a variety of backgrounds and political
views (Xia, et al. 2019).
While the IRA was used to spread disinformation, the goal was not to spread outrageous
lies or specifically support one side of a political race. According to former IRA employee
Ludmila Savchuk, the workers in the IRA would begin each day by switching on an Internet
proxy service and masking their I.P. addresses from any place they posted, which is an additional
way to obscure where these posts originated. Workers then received a list of opinions that they
were responsible for sharing and publicizing throughout the day, as well as a list of technical
tasks that included all of the bullet points they were to cover on no less than six social media
accounts daily (Chen, 2015). To illustrate, during the civil war in Ukraine, when Russia was
backing the separatists, the IRA workers would post disparaging comments on the Ukrainian
president which aligned his policy making with NATO, rather than Russia (Chen, 2015). In the
United States, most of the posts were intended to be divisive, with the objective being to
exacerbate divisions and sow discord among the American public (US v. IRA, 2018). The IRA
operated at the discretion of the Kremlin, in order to carry out the Kremlin’s multi-pronged
campaign, which was aimed at controlling the social media narrative and using perceptibly
credible news sources in order to shape the information as the Kremlin desired. The Russians did
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this through an army of trolls, the IRA, and through state run news sources, like RT (Campbell,
2014, p. 2). Russia utilized these tactics to mold the West's public opinion. Russia also used these
Information Warfare tools to shape the public perspective of its own citizens, in order to portray
Russia in a positive way (Chen, 2015).
Information Warfare, as Russia has shown, can be used to create both positive and
negative impacts. When the Russian ruble collapsed, the workers of the IRA were instructed to
post optimistic posts about the pace of recovery. Negative social media posts about the West and
positive comments about Russia may seem to be simplistic and ineffective; however, on a grand
scale, the posts likely influenced some of the social media population (Chen, 2015). It is difficult
to empirically prove this, as many of the accounts were created to hide any affiliation with
Russia. However, in the United States, social media companies subsequently began creating
policies to take down fake accounts (Horowitz & McMillan, 2019). However, such account
suspensions and removals is proving to be more difficult than first thought. The hypothetical
difficulty is that even if 100 accounts are taken down, there are likely 200 more created in twelve
hours. This illustrates how Information Warfare incites infinite conflict by using technical means
to inflict psychological or non-kinetic damage against one’s adversary.
The threat that Russia poses to the United States is based upon both
information-psychology and information-technical. Russia understands that symmetric conflict
against the United States will be expensive and likely un-winnable. Therefore, Russia believes
that their response to the United States must be one of intellectual superiority, with asymmetric
information used as a weapon. This, in the long run, will be less expensive, and the applications
of Information Warfare are expansive (Giles, 2016). The reason Russia is looking for the less
expensive route is likely in order to keep up with other nation-states.
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Keeping up with the competition of other nation-states can be challenging, and this is
where it is believed that Russia has not sought superpower status through wealth or kinetic force.
Rather, Russia has chosen to pursue a dominant position characterized by an extensive ability to
exert influence or project power on a global scale. As Russia has indicated, this goal is pursued
through combined means of economic, military, technological, political and cultural strength, as
well as diplomatic influence (Munro, 2020). In other words, Russia does not have to be the most
powerful nation, or even the richest nation on the planet, if they have a strong, multi-faceted
approach to building power and dominance. Their objective is to cause every other nation-state,
most specifically the United States, to be perceived as a weak nation-state. This perception will
intentionally project Russia as a much more stable country long-term.
Russia has some cyber vulnerabilities that can be considered blind spots. Russia’s
domestic shortcomings when it comes to cyberspace are not very different then other
superpowers in the 21st century. Russia has fallen victim to numerous events, including a
malware attack in 2017. “The 2017 WannaCry outbreak significantly impacted Russia. The
ransomware infected thousands of corporate and government networks” (Morgan, 2019, p. 2).
For this reason, Russia has been attempting to become less reliant on foreign software. Since
2014, when Russia was slapped with sanctions by the West, the Kremlin has been pushing for
more domestic cyber options (Morgan, 2019). Given these weaker cyber defenses, Russia is
likely trying to advance and become more reliant on the ability to become self-sufficient in the
cyber domain.
As Russia continues to attempt advancing their own cyber domain, it continually uses its
Information Warfare operations to shape changing perspectives. The ultimate perception shift
being that as Russia grows stronger, as the United States and the Western democracies weaken
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through polarized divides and infrastructure issues (Jankowicz, 2020). The reality is that Russia
is creating and heavily influencing these divides, as well as conducting cyber attacks, while
continuing to operate unscathed in some public perception. Russia is not growing more powerful
by traditional means, such as growing the economy or its military, but instead is advancing
through the world the technology and strengthening influence through information campaigns.
The rhetorical and tactical question becomes why fight a country with a kinetic tactic, when
covert weakening of the country can be accomplished through Information Warfare.
In Russia’s quest to be the most dominant superpower, the question remains as to how it
can further weaken the United States and other superpowers. The most vulnerable objects for the
United States are its citizens and its critical infrastructure. The critical infrastructure is protected
under the Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP), and federal policies all identified (CISA, 2020). The critical infrastructure encompasses
sixteen different sectors for the United States, some of which include food and agriculture, water,
waste, energy, and emergency services. All sixteen sectors are, as the name suggests, critical to
the United States’ functionality as a nation-state and first-world country. These sectors are all
essential, and their interconnectedness poses potentially disastrous results if one region is
attacked, due to the possible ripple-effect to other interconnected regions and infrastructures.
Herein lies the problem that President Biden and the United States need to address. One of the
biggest concerns pertaining to critical infrastructure is the number of vulnerabilities of the power
grid (CISA, 2020).
Power Grids as Targets
Power grids have emerged as a possible target now due to the attacks that occurred in
Ukraine in 2015 (Lee et al., 2016). The reason for this targeting is that given the grids’
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vulnerability and potential consequences of massive economic and social disruption, it is more
effective in both cost and risk to attempt to create issues with a power grid than to attack any one
sector of the critical infrastructure. The energy infrastructure of the United States is crucial to the
critical infrastructure. “Presidential Policy Directive 21 identifies the Energy Sector as uniquely
critical because it provides an ‘enabling function’ across all critical infrastructure sectors.”
(CISA, 2020) A contingency plan from the Council on Foreign Relations stated that “disabling
or otherwise interfering with the power grid in a significant way could … seriously harm the
United States” (Knake, 2017, p. 1). Creating a widespread and partial or long-lasting loss of
electrical power for a nation-state can have disastrous effects in the diplomatic, information,
military, and economic sectors of a country. In 2016, a report by infrastructure engineering and
construction consultancy Black and Veatch ranked cybersecurity, in the United States, as the
most pressing issue for electric utilities, second only to reliability (Kshetri & Voas, 2017, p. 91).
As stated previously, the United States’ critical infrastructure is built upon sixteen interdependent
systems. The more pressing issue is that all of these systems are inherently reliant, in some way,
upon electricity. If a CNO successfully targeted and conducted an attack on the United States’
power grid, this could effectively shut down the country’s critical infrastructure, which could
cripple the United States as a whole (Kshetri & Voas, 2017).
To understand how an attack of this caliber could occur, one must briefly understand how
the United States power grid operates. The United States has over 5.5 million miles of
distribution power lines that transmit electricity to all facets of the industrial and geographic
locales throughout the country (Knake, 2017). The grid is designed so that if demand goes up in
one location, or major electrical infrastructure goes down, power can be re-routed to prevent
blackouts. This capability helps combat issues such as extreme weather, technical malfunctions,
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or even a terrorist attack. While blackouts throughout the country may occur, such blackouts are
not due to the United States relying solely on one power grid. In fact, the power grid is divided
into three different grids. The separate grids are called interconnections, and they are specifically
named the Western, the Eastern, and the Texas interconnections. While power transfer goes on
within each of the interconnections, it is challenging to interconnect one region to another. In
other words, the West cannot easily power the East, and vice-versa (Bellini, 2014). As these grids
are connected throughout their respective regions in the country, the infrastructure that the grids
have been built upon are becoming dated. As the United States attempts to use more renewable
energy, such as windmills or solar power, these renewable sources of energy are established in
remote locations. The complicating issue is that some of the power lines do not currently reach
some of the new energy sources coming on line. In other words, these renewable energy sources
cannot be grafted onto the grid without creating more direct power lines and substations.
Although the system has some redundancies built into it, blackouts become a risk if there is a
demand for power too quickly and power stations cannot keep up with the demand. Operators
then must distribute power to multiple locations until power can be distributed normally again.
These are what is known as rolling blackouts. If too many high capacity transmission lines or
transmission substations go down for any reason, including potential cyber malfunctions, the
system or parts of it could be overwhelmed and fail (Bellini, 2014).
The United States is still in the wake of understanding how one winter storm took out
ninety percent of the Texas power grid in early 2021. The polar vortex created issues for most
individuals living on the Texas grid. What became evidenced was how the United States power
grid operates, including the inherent infrastructure issues and environmental problems. The
power outage illustrated the overwhelming effect that the lack of electricity can have on society.
30
The storm and the power outage created such a dire situation that the Department of Homeland
Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency were called to provide emergency aid.
Although Texas was hit the hardest, the outage created ripple effects for other parts of the
country, slowing down supply chains and advertising potential vulnerabilities of one-third of the
United States’ power grid. The United States has a robust electrical grid and infrastructure, but
not an impervious one. Over the last forty years, the United States has dealt with severe winter
storms, flooding, hurricanes, droughts and wildfires. As these storms have become more
consistent, the cost to fix the infrastructure after each event increases exponentially. In the last
forty years, the cost to fix these issues has gone from under 5 billion dollars a year in 1980 (12.5
billion in today’s dollars) to a present-day average of 16.5 billion dollars a year (Marshall, 2021).
Although the United States can better improve its energy sector with proper weather proofing of
electricity creating abilities, the energy sector is still a crucial part of the infrastructure, and it is
clearly at risk.
In December 2020, the United States Department of Energy announced that it would
create a subcommittee that is dedicated to finding a new approach to deal with growing threats to
the United States’ electrical grid (Riley, 2020). As the United States slowly shifts toward a more
green energy policy, to include renewables, there has not been too much thought to what cyber
risks may occur to the electrical grid (Riley, 2020). This threat is a real concern to the United
States, as this issue has been seen both domestically and abroad. In 2015, the first cyber attack
that disrupted a power grid occured in Ukraine (Lee et al., 2016). Prior to 2015, attacks on power
grids were theoretical at worst. The fact of the matter is that attacks on power grids are no longer
a hypothetical concern; such attacks are now a non-kinetic action with kinetic, real-world effects.
In the Ukrainian case, attackers targeted substations that lower transmission voltages for
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distribution to consumers. Although it was not definitive who was at fault for these attacks on the
power system, geopolitical circumstances and forensic evidence suggest Russian involvement. A
year after the power grid issues in Ukraine, Russian hackers targeted a transmission level
substation, blacking out part of Kiev. If an adversary like Russia has proven this capability, it is
likely a matter of time until it attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities within other nation-states,
such as the United States (Lee et al., 2016).
In 2014, the National Security Agency (NSA) director, Admiral Rogers, testified before
the United States Congress about the growing threats toward the United States. He stated that
“several nation states likely had the capability to shut down the U.S. power grid” (Knake, 2017,
p. 1). The reasoning for this was due to rapid digitization in other nation-states and weak
practices within the United States. Specifically, the weak practices were those of low investment
into cybersecurity of critical infrastructure and weak regulation. These weak practices created a
high level of vulnerability for the United States’ power system.
The United States’ power grid becomes the target of new threats each year. This has been
placed at the forefront of many policy makers’ minds, but significant enough changes are slow to
take place.  The cultural shift, like most things in society, is to digitize the power grid, and the
approach to the critical infrastructure is no different. A digital transformation is not coming;
rather, it is here. What the Covid-19 pandemic illustrated for people is that society could achieve
connectivity to work from anywhere. Workers are using Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), which
allow for users to securely access files and systems from a remote location. Although this
technological capability aided in work production during a pandemic, which likely saved
thousands more lives, it created a time bomb for nefarious users or adversary nations to create a
CNO to attack or exploit important data (Riley, 2020) This data could originate with private
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industries, government organizations, or the military. As the United States has created the ability
to work through VPN, this, in itself, increases the attack surface area. Interconnected abilities
have created even more avenues for foreign entities to attack the United States’ already
vulnerable infrastructure (Riley, 2020).
As the Covid-19 pandemic increased remote work across nearly all levels of life in the
United States, more routes were likely added into government systems. These routes did not
necessarily simplify the approach Russia or another foreign adversary may take, but it opened
the door for attacks to have a higher potential to inflict grave damage (Adelmann & Gaidosch,
2020). It is not a hypothetical contemplation that Russia could target the United States’ power
grid or critical infrastructure, because those entities have likely been targeted previously. In
2018, the Trump administration blamed the Russian government for a campaign of cyber attacks
against the United States’ power grid that dated back to at least 2016. This benchmarked the first
time the United States publicly accused the Kremlin of hacking into the American energy
infrastructure. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) stated that a “multi-stage intrusion campaign by Russian government cyber
actors” targeted networks of small commercial facilities (Volz & Gardner, 2018, p. 1). This
attack occurred likely as a direct result of the United States Treasury Department imposing
sanctions on nineteen Russian people and five groups, including Moscow’s intelligence services
(Volz & Gardner, 2018).
Although this attack did not do enough damage to negatively affect the power grid,
attacks on the United States’ power grid are not an uncommon occurrence, and they have
increased in frequency over the last few years. According to the President’s National
Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), “the United States DHS Industrial Control Systems
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Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) reported 290 cyber attacks on critical
infrastructure control systems in fiscal year 2016” (NIAC, 2017, p. 27). Roughly half of those
attacks targeted one of the three power grids. Power grid attacks on the United States and the
world have increased not only in attempts, but in severity as well. The cyber attack on Kiev in
2015 and 2016, which shut down sectors of the power grid, was considered by ESET (Enjoy
Safer Technology) security researchers to be the biggest threat to the industrial control systems
since Stuxnet (Cherepanov, 2017). This attack was a malware framework later known as
“Industroyer,” also known as “CrashOverride,” and its express purpose was to attack power
grids. The framework is a sophisticated, multi-component malware designed to disrupt the
working processes of industrial control systems, specifically those used in electrical substations.
As stated previously, it was the first cyber attack that was ever seen to attack and shut down a
power grid. While it may appear, on the surface, that this attack was isolated to Ukraine, the
issue is that “Ukraine uses equipment and security protections of the same vendors as everybody
else in the world” (Muncaster, 2017 p. 1). Therefore, if any malicious attacker learns how to get
around these systems in the Ukrainian infrastructure, then they will have concurrently developed
TTPs to conduct attacks directly on the West.
Energy grid issues create vulnerabilities in both the physical and psychological realms.
Physical blackouts for a critical infrastructure are a finite problem, wherein if electricity does not
support the critical infrastructure, then a nation-state’s information structure, supply chain, and
overall economic foundation are unstable. These events, in turn, can have a cascading effect
upon issues facing a country's citizens. Psychologically, if a country’s infrastructure and policy
makers cannot protect citizens from these problems, political divides and potential mistrust in the
government can occur (DoE, 2016). A hypothetical CNO that would attack or even degrade an
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already weakened United States power grid and or infrastructure could allow Russia to achieve
its goals through Information Warfare. If a country has citizens who do not trust their
government or the infrastructure to protect them from foreign adversaries this could create unrest
and a heightened climate of internal conflict. Russia will rely on the stability of its country and
the weakening of other superpower nation states.
Reinforcing the Infrastructure
As Russia continues to administer and conduct Information Warfare, the West,
specifically the United States, will have to learn how to combat their TTPs and strategize against
this type of warfare. In order to attain effectiveness against the Kremlin, the United States has
utilized, and will continue to need to utilize, the intelligence community on protecting critical
infrastructure. Infrastructure in the United States includes the sixteen sectors that fall under the
responsibility of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). CISA was formed in
2018 as a standalone United States federal agency, which is an operational component under the
DHS oversight (CISA, 2020). “CISA’s present mission is to defend today in order to secure
tomorrow” (CISA 2020, p. 1). CISA is the nation’s risk advisor, working with partners to defend
against today’s threats, and it works with DHS to build a more secure and resilient infrastructure
for the future. The threats that CISA faces are both digital and physical, as well as man-made,
technological, and natural. The threats are increasingly complex, and the threat actors are more
diverse than ever before. The Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and
Analysis (DHS I&A) is a member of the intelligence community, and it plays an increasingly
important role in supporting and defending the United States. According to the Critical
Infrastructure Threat Information Sharing Framework (2016), through analysis, the DHS I&A is
able to collect, analyze, and disseminate threat information that is specific to critical
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infrastructure in support of the DHS’s national security mission. Although CISA has its own
intelligence that is tied into the DHS, where it falls in regard to the intelligence community can
become a complex issue. As threats can come from both inside and outside of the United States,
a threat upon the critical infrastructure could be an act of terrorism, or even an act of war. The
threat can originate virtually anywhere, from a nation-state to an NGO. It is CISA’s responsibility
to ensure that the United States’ critical infrastructure is safe.
While CISA has the ability to perform indications and warnings and deliver this
intelligence to policymakers, it is what those individuals choose to do with this information that
will make all the difference in the outcome. Russia and other near-peer countries have attempted
to compromise the United States’ elections, critical infrastructure, and the average American
citizen through various types of disinformation. Although Russia has bolstered their Information
Warfare capabilities, the United States has made steps towards ensuring the security of its own
information. Chris Krebs, the former director of CISA, stated that the 2020 elections were “the
most secure (elections) in American history” (Wise, 2020, p. 1). Since the inception of CISA, the
agency’s most pressing goal was to ensure the security of the American democratic process.
Although fired by former President Trump, Krebs, along with the rest of CISA, did in fact ensure
there was no tampering of the vote or the entire election, as was confirmed by the DNI report on
16 March 2021 (ODNI, 2021). The report also revealed broad efforts by both Russia and Iran to
shape the election outcome. The report found evidence of Russian efforts to conduct influence
operations against President Biden and the Democratic Party. Unlike the 2016 elections, there
was no persistent Russian effort to gain access to election infrastructure from a cyber effort. By
stating there were broad efforts by Russia and Iran to shape the outcome of the election, it is
those adversaries utilizing information-psychology. By stating there was no persistent effort by
36
Russia to gain access to election infrastructure, this means Russia did not use
information-technology means. A key element to the Kremlin’s strategy in the 2020 election
cycle was to again use proxy forces to push disinformation narratives, likely composed by
Russian intelligence. This is nearly identical to how the IRA conducted operations in the past
(ODNI, 2021).
Although the United States is knowledgeable about how Russia has been attempting to
undermine elections, such knowledge has not stopped Russia from conducting attacks. The latest
attack of Information Warfare was discovered in December 2020. It was a supply chain attack
that eventually led to Russian malware being found in the Departments of Commerce, State,
Energy, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, the National Institute of Health, and
several private industries (CISA, 2021). The attack was delivered through a private company
named SolarWinds Orion. The technical name of the attack was, CVE-2020-10148, which is
now referred to as the “solar winds hack.” This attack was carried out by a sophisticated APT
(advanced persistent threat) actor. Typically, APTs are so sophisticated that they need some sort
of high-level or state funding. According to a recent SEC filing by SolarWinds, approximately
18,000 customers were affected by this vulnerability (CISA, 2021). This attack occurred in
March 2020, but it was not discovered and brought to the public's attention until December of the
same year. The Kremlin is the highly likely author of this attack. The ability that Russia now has
to hide cyber exploitations for long periods of time in critical parts of the United States
government goes to show how important CISA’s role will likely be to both policy makers and to
the intelligence community. Although Krebs believes that the 2020 election was the most secure
in American history, the United States has a long way to go in terms of understanding how to
combat ever-advancing Russian technological forces (CISA, 2021).
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Given Russia’s ability to control the narrative over social media and state-run news
sources, Russia has increasing potential to negatively affect the critical infrastructure of the
United States. This creates more issues than solutions for policy makers. The solar winds hack
has made policy makers and members of the intelligence community aware of how far Russia’s
reach concerning Information Warfare can go. Russia is not simply attacking one critical node of
American society. Rather, Russian Information Warfare is psychologically altering the
information Americans receive and how Americans comprehend the information, as well as
exploiting American information to better understand and manipulate American infrastructure.
Simply put, the Russians are finding ways to divide members of society through social media,
creating disinformation campaigns, and threatening critical infrastructure with CNOs. In any
warfare, hampering the adversaries’ ability to communicate is key to victory. Russia understands
this and will continue to fight against the United States, along with any threatening force to the
Kremlin, through Information Warfare.
Understanding how to combat Russia is synonymous with having the ability to
comprehend Information Warfare. Identifying the differences in Russian strategy and warfare are
important, as well. It is now understood that Russia has a much higher acceptance of risk and a
lower threshold for the use of force than previously thought (Arquilla, 2019). Becoming
cognizant of the critical targets that Russia will likely seek out through Information Warfare is
crucial for the American intelligence community and policy makers specifically to understand.
Although CISA was created and tasked with creating a safer infrastructure, it is still in its
infancy. There are several action points that the intelligence community needs to crystallize in
order to aid in support against Information Warfare. First and foremost, it must be determined
who is in charge when the United States is hit with an Information Warfare attack. Due to the
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fact that the intelligence community and other agencies are so compartmentalized in their
functions, assigning a hierarchy of coordinated leadership and response can be a difficult task.
The intelligence community is compartmentalized, with each agency dealing with its own
specific mission set (U.S. National Intelligence, 2013).
As Russia has expanded its Information Warfare avenues, each realm lies in a different
sector, agency, or department within the United States. Therefore, the intelligence community
must be aware of all of the tendrils of Russia’s reach. The intelligence community needs to set up
a strong independent agency that is tied to directly support CISA. CISA needs to be made aware
of how the adversary will likely attack through the ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques,
and Common Knowledge) model. Furthermore, the CISA/Intelligence needs to be able to work
directly with the intelligence community and be designated as another branch of the overarching
intelligence community. This will allow for the sharing of intelligence with the rest of the
community while still protecting the United States’ infrastructure. Any indications and warnings
pertaining to Information Warfare, whether from Russia or any other adversary, should be tasked
to CISA. CISA’s supervision of sixteen separate sectors under the critical infrastructure allows
for vast and crucial oversight, with the ability to answer to the ODNI. CISA needs to have direct
support and communication with the intelligence community, which will allow for CISA to share
intelligence findings at both the executive and the legislative levels of government. If CISA were
to be a member of or be directly supported by the intelligence community, it would allow for
more directive indications and warnings  (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021).
Disinformation has proven difficult to combat, but the United States cannot rely solely on
content moderation. Content moderation simply means being cognizant of the source of
information (Jankowicz, 2020). This can be difficult if one does not know if the source of their
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information is credible or is disinformation. In order to combat some of the disinformation
campaigns from Russia, nation-states such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Ukraine have
begun to rely on citizen-based solutions. Specifically, these countries have pursued investing in
media, digital literacy, cyber hygiene, and basic level awareness. If the American government
were to invest with private sectors to create similar awareness, there would likely be some
successes concerning the fight against disinformation campaigns. The United States needs to
follow the forward-thinking examples of other Eastern European countries and act accordingly
(Jankowicz, 2020).
Electronic warfare (EW) should be specifically handled by the NSA and the Department
of Defense (DoD), but CISA needs to be privy to this information, as EW may lead to attacks on
the infrastructure as well. All of the agencies listed above need thorough education and
understanding of adversaries’ terminologies and of how Russia operates in the realm of
Information Warfare. The United States and its agencies must understand that all of Russian
Information Warfare bleeds together and is used in a coordinated way to create a multi-pronged
attack against other nation-states. Therefore, the United States cannot truly separate each one of
the responding agencies. The agencies must be tasked with cooperating with one another, while
still respecting the rule of law and the Constitution of the United States.
If Russia is allowed to continue to conduct Information Warfare unimpeded, it will be
increasingly difficult for the United States to remain the leading global superpower. If the United
States does not protect itself against CNO and social media disinformation campaigns, the
United States will continue to quarrel internally. The United States can combat this through
intelligence indications and warnings to enhance the protection of the critical infrastructure. The
other way for the United States to fight against Information Warfare, specifically disinformation,
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is through media literacy and content moderation. A foreign adversary creating a narrative that
forces Americans to pick a side, without deference to American traditions of reasoned debate and
compromise, will likely beget more problems within the United States. In addition, the
infrastructure of the nation must be strengthened and protected before it is expanded, else a
vulnerable network creates a vulnerable nation (Jankowicz, 2020).
Conclusion
As illustrated throughout this paper, Russian perception of information warfare is not
simply disinformation, or CNO. It is an umbrella term for how Russia utilizes non-kinetic
warfare in a broader framework. Russia sees the domain of information warfare as an infinite
conflict with the West. They believe this due to the fact that the United States and other Western
nations aided in the organization of ousting authoritarian regimes that the Kremlin supported. As
the United States and the West become increasingly dependent upon technology and
communication, for governmental, military or personal use, the West also becomes exponentially
more vulnerable. The Kremlin understands this dependency and wishes to exploit it in order to
create challenges for the West and to create opportunities for Russia. Russia has utilized
Information Warfare strategies, specifically psychological operations and disinformation
campaigns, in order to aid in the creation of a positive perception of the Russian nation-state. The
Kremlin has managed to sway some individuals' biases through creating state-run news agencies
and using troll farms to control large populations that use social media. President Putin’s
approval ratings increased each year that there was a large-scale information warfare operation.
(Elagina, 2021). Although this is simply correlation and not causation, understanding the trends
of the Russian population can be applicable to how these campaigns can sway narratives in
Russia and in other countries.
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The critical infrastructure of the United States, while crucially important, can also be an
incredibly vulnerable system. In this paper, primary, secondary, and even tertiary issues can
come from a degraded infrastructure. While there has been no successful attack on the United
States power grid, it is feasible for an adversary like Russia to conduct this type of non-kinetic
attack in the future, as evidenced by Russia’s attack of power grids in Ukraine  (Lee et al., 2016).
Russian philosophy of Information Warfare is that of a holistic approach in order to
create a fog and friction that the Kremlin controls. Russia has used this type of warfare and has
enhanced it for decades, to the point where communication and infrastructures may fail the West.
As Russia continues to believe that it is in an Information War with the United States and the
West, it is highly probable that Russia will continue to attack through disinformation and other
non-kinetic means. Russia’s goal of becoming a world power has not only met but surpassed its
goal of becoming a world power. Russia’s new goal of becoming the most dominant world power
will likely be met, if unimpeded, through consistent asymmetric Information Warfare.
42
References
Adelmann, F., & Gaidosch, T. (2020, May 6). Cybersecurity of Remote Work During the
Pandemic. IMF.org.
en-special-series-on-covid-19-cybersecurity-of-remote-work-during-pandemic.pdf.
Allyn, B. (2020, June 16). Study Exposes Russia Disinformation Campaign That Operated
In The Shadows For 6 Years. NPR.
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/16/878169027/study-exposes-russia-disinformation-campaign
-that-operated-in-the-shadows-for-6-.
ARQUILLA, J. et al. (2019, May). Russian Strategic Intentions: A Strategic Multilayer
Assessment (SMA) White Paper. National Security Innovations. Strategic Multilayer
Assessment.




Bunce Valerie. (2017). The Prospects for a Color Revolution in Russia. Daedalus, 146(2),
19–29.
Calhoun, M. (2011). CLAUSEWITZ AND JOMINI: Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks
in Military Theory. Army History, (80), 22-37. Retrieved March 21, 2021, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26296157
Campbell, T., Clapp, V., & Wallin, M. (2014). (Rep.). American Security Project. Retrieved
March 13, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06043
Chen, A. (2015, June 2). The Agency. The New York Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html.
Cherepanov, A. (2017, June 12). Industroyer echoes Stuxnet in its threat to critical
infrastructure. eset.com/int. https://www.eset.com/int/industroyer/.
CISA. (2020, October 21). Critical infrastructure sectors.
https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors.
CISA. (2021, March 15). The SolarWinds Cyber-Attack: What You Need to Know. CIS.
https://www.cisecurity.org/solarwinds/.
Clausewitz, C. von, Howard, M., & Paret, P. (1989). On war. Princeton University Press.
43
Connor, M., & Vogler, S., Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare1–38 (2017). Washington
DC; Office of the Chief of Naval Operation.




Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Critical Infrastructure Threat
Information Sharing Framework A Reference Guide for the Critical Infrastructure
Community (2016). Washington, DC; CISA.




Elagina, D. (2021, February 25). Putin approval rating Russia monthly 2021. Statista.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/
Ellick, A. B., & Westbrook, A. (2018, November 13). Operation Infektion: A three-part
video series on Russian disinformation. The New York Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/12/opinion/russia-meddling-disinformation-fake-news-e
lections.html.
Fisher, M. (2019, April 29). In case you weren't clear on Russia Today's relationship to
Moscow, Putin clears it up. The Washington Post.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/06/13/in-case-you-werent-cle
ar-on-russia-todays-relationship-to-moscow-putin-clears-it-up/.
Giles, K. (2016). Handbook of Russian Information Warfare. NATO Defence College
Research Division.
Glenn, J. C. (1989). In Future mind: artificial intelligence: merging the mystical and the
technological in the 21st century (Chp 9). Acropolis Books.
Hench, T. (2009). CLAUSEWITZ VS. JOMINI: PUTTING "STRATEGY" INTO
HISTORICAL CONTEXT. Academy of Management Proceedings, 2009(1), 1–6.
https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2009.44260430
44
Horwitz, J., & McMillan, R. (2019, December 20). Facebook, Twitter Remove AI-Powered
Fake Accounts With Pro-Trump Messages. The Wall Street Journal.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-twitter-remove-ai-powered-fake-accounts-with-pro-
trump-messages-11576873453.
Howard-Johnston, J. (1999). Heraclius' Persian Campaigns and the Revival of the East
Roman Empire, 622–630. War in History, 6(1), 1-44. Retrieved April 20, 2021, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26014109
Jankowicz, N. (2020). How To Lose The Information War: russia, fake news, and the future
of conflict. I B TAURIS.
Jonsson, O. (2019). The Russian understanding of war blurring the lines between war and
peace. Georgetown University Press.
Krebs, B. (2017, June 22). Why So Many Top Hackers Hail from Russia. Krebs on Security.
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/06/why-so-many-top-hackers-hail-from-russia/.
Krišjānis BušsRegional Coordinator, T. S. (2019, September 9). Russia Stirs Fear of Color
Revolutions. Democracy Speaks.
https://www.democracyspeaks.org/blog/russia-stirs-fear-color-revolutions.
Kshetri, N., & Voas, J. (2017). Hacking Power Grids: A Current Problem. Computer,
50(12), 91-95. https://doi-org.easydb.angelo.edu/10.1109/MC.2017.4451203
Knake, R. (2017, April 3). A cyber attack on the U.S. Power Grid. Council on Foreign
Relations. http://www.cfr.org/report/cyber attack-us-power-grid.
Lee, R. M., Assante, M. J., & Conway, T. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack
on the Ukrainian Power Grid. sans.org.
https://www.sans.org/industrial-control-systems-security/.
Lere, P. (2017, April). Fog, friction, and logistics.
https://www.army.mil/article/185864/fog_friction_and_logistics.
Lilly, B., & Cheravitch, J. (2020). The past, present, and future of Russia's cyber strategy
and forces. NATO CCDCOE.




Morgan, N. (2019, March 26). Russia's Cyber Attacks Blindspot and Preventive Measures:
GRI. Global Risk Insights.
https://globalriskinsights.com/2019/03/russia-cyber-attacks-blindspot/.
Mueller, R. S., Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016
presidential election (2019). Washington, D.C.; U.S. D.O.J.





Munro, A. (2020, January 22). Superpower. Encyclopedia Britannica.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/superpower
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Riga. (2019). 2007 Cyber Attacks
on Estonia. Riga, Latvia.
NIAC. (2017, August). National Infrastructure Advisory Council Securing Cyber Assets:
Addressing Urgent Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure Final Report. Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency CISA.
https://www.cisa.gov/publication/niac-securing-cyber-assets-addressing-urgent-cyber-threa
ts-critical-infrastructure-final.
ODNI, & National Intelligence Council, Foreign threats to the 2020 US federal elections
(2021). Washington, DC; DNI.
Olga Bertelsen. (2021). Russian Active Measures : Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow: Vol.
Auflage. ibidem.
Ottis, R. (2018, October). Analysis of the 2007 Cyber Attacks against Estonia from the
Information Warfare Perspective. CCDCOE.
https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/analysis-of-the-2007-cyber-attacks-against-estonia-f
rom-the-information-warfare-perspective/.
Pacepa, I. M., & Rychlak, R. J. (2013). Disinformation: former spy chief reveals secret
strategies for undermining freedom, attacking religion, and promoting terrorism. WND
Books.
Reed, J. (2012, January 23). Modern Fog and Friction. Modern Fog and Friction | Small
Wars Journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/modern-fog-and-friction.
46
Riley, T. (2020, December 8). Analysis | the cybersecurity 202: Securing the electric grid
should be priority For BIDEN'S first 100 DAYS, expert says.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/08/cybersecurity-202-securing-electric-
grid-should-be-priority-biden-first-100-days-expert-says/.
RFE/RL. (2014, January 26). Ukraine Opposition Vows To Continue Struggle.
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.
https://www.rferl.org/a/protesters-police-tense-standoff-ukraine/25241945.html.
SATIA, P. (2010). War, Wireless, and Empire: Marconi and the British Warfare State,
1896-1903. Technology and Culture, 51(4), 829-853. Retrieved April 20, 2021, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40928027
Singer, P. W., & Friedman, A. (2014). Cybersecurity and cyberwar: what everyone needs
to know. Oxford University Press.
Sukman, D. (2016, November 23). The Institutional Level of War. The Strategy Bridge.
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/5/5/the-institutional-level-of-war.




Titcomb, J. (2017, November 14). Governments in 30 countries are paying 'keyboard
armies' to spread propaganda, report says. The Telegraph.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/11/14/governments-30-countries-pay-keyboa
rd-armies-spread-propaganda/.
Transparency International. (2021, March 1). Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 for
Russia. Transparency.org. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/rus#.
Tzu, S. (2017). Sun tzu's the art of war: bilingual chinese and english text - complete
edition. Tuttle Publishing.
United States of America v. Internet Research Agency et al. (2018, February 16). United
States district court for the district of Columbia. Retrieved from:
https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download.
U.S. national intelligence: an overview, 2013. (2013). Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
47
Volz, D., & Gardner, T. (2018, March 15). In a first, U.S. blames Russia for cyber attacks
on energy grid. Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-sanctions-energygrid/in-a-first-u-s-blames-ru
ssia-for-cyber-attacks-on-energy-grid-idUSKCN1GR2G3.
Walker, S. (2017, October 17). Russian troll factory paid US activists to help fund protests
during election. The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/17/russian-troll-factory-activists-protests-us-
election.
World Politicis Review. (2021, February 8). Can Putin Change Russia's Role From Spoiler
to Global Power? World Politics Review.
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/27815/russia-s-putin-crafts-an-unusual-role-
in-the-global-order.
Xia, Y., Lukito, J., Zhang, Y., Wells, C., Kim, S. J., & Tong, C. (2019). Disinformation,
performed: self-presentation of a Russian IRA account on Twitter. Information,
Communication & Society, 22(11), 1646–1664.
https://doi-org.easydb.angelo.edu/10.1080/1369118X.2019.1621921
Wise, A. (2020, November 18). Trump Fires Election Security Director Who Corrected
Voter Fraud Disinformation. NPR.
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/17/936003057/cisa-director-chris-krebs-fired-after-trying-to-c
orrect-voter-fraud-disinformati.
